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In this paper we find empirical evidence of bank lending channel for Colombia
and Argentina. For Argentina, we do not find evidence that changes in the
interbank interest rate affect the growth rate of total loans directly. However, the
interbank interest rate affects the loan supply through its interactions with
capitalization and liquidity. For Colombia, there is direct bank lending channel,
which is reinforced through interactions with capitalization and liquidity. Also,
using a panel data of more than 3,300 firms, we provide additional support to
the existence of a bank lending channel for Colombia.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While economists agree that monetary policy can affect real output in the
short run, there is still a lot of controversy on how does monetary policy exactly
operate.
The most commonly discussed channel, the traditional interest rate
channel, suggests that when the Fed decreases money supply (exchanging bonds
for bank reserves), nominal and real interest rates will increase –the effect of
monetary policy on the real interest rates works through an assumption of sticky
prices in the short run. Consequently, investment and present consumption
decrease, and therefore aggregate demand (AD) decreases. However, as Bernanke
and Gertler (1995) point out, empirical studies of the interest rate channel have
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not been entirely successful in explaining large changes in GDP and AD
components due to moderate changes in the interest rates induced by monetary
policy. These empirical findings have led to a vast literature that tries to identify
and quantify other monetary transmission mechanisms, which complement and
amplify the interest rate channel.
A long-standing question is whether financial institutions in general, and
banks in particular, play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy
to the real economy. The literature identifies two channels in which financial
institutions might play a significant role, namely, the balance sheet channel (or
broad credit channel) and the bank lending channel (or narrow credit channel).
The balance sheet channel was first introduced by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989). The main idea of this mechanism is that in the presence of imperfect
capital markets, informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders cause
a gap in the cost of internal and external sources of funding to borrowers. In
general, this gap has a negative relation with the collateral of the borrower. A
contractionary monetary policy has the effect of increasing real interest rates,
therefore reducing the value of assets that act as collateral, which has the effect
of deteriorating credit worthiness of borrowers. Therefore, consumption and
investment plans that would be profitable if financed entirely with internal sources
of funding are no longer profitable when financed partially with external sources.
This effect leads to a lower level of AD in the economy, magnifying the effects
of the interest rate channel. Note that there is no specific role played by banks in
the broad credit channel.
On the other hand, the bank lending channel gives a specific role to banks.
The basic idea is that a contractionary monetary policy that reduces bank deposits
creates a need for alternative funds in order to maintain the level of loans. If such
alternative funds are scarce or not available, then banks will necessarily reduce
their loan supply, affecting negatively consumption and investment plans.
Therefore, the bank lending channel amplifies the effect on AD of a contractionary
monetary policy.
In order to have a bank lending channel two conditions are required: first,
some firms must be dependent on bank loans; second, the central bank must be
able to shift bank loan supply schedules. Regarding the first condition, there is
evidence that suggests that small firms are bank dependent1. This occurs because
banks have a comparative advantage in the sense of having lower costs of obtaining
information about (and monitoring) their customers than other investors. Also,
small firms generally lack access to securities markets. This effect will be more
important for countries with less developed capital markets.
With respect to the second condition, a contractionary monetary policy
has the effect of reducing the aggregate level of deposits2. Since these are one of
1 For US, see for example Fazzari et al. (1988).
2 Bernanke and Blinder (1992) show that aggregate deposit fall immediately when the Fed tightens
monetary policy. Using bank dissagregated data, Kashyap and Stein (1995) also provide evidence
that supports this.
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the least expensive sources of financing for banks, it will be costly (for some
banks) and even impossible (for others)3 to offset the shortage in deposits with
other sources of funding. In particular, if the Modigliani-Miller financial
irrelevance theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) does not hold for the banking
firm, some banks will not be able to obtain loanable funds required to maintain
their level of lending, and therefore their loan supply will drop4. Then financial
variables that measure banks’ financial health can play an important role, in the
sense that banks with weak balance sheets are more affected by informational
asymmetries than banks with stronger balance sheets.
In this paper, we look for evidence consistent with the bank lending channel
literature for Argentina and Colombia. We find evidence that supports the existence
of a lending channel of monetary policy for Colombia, but there does not seem
to exist a strong evidence of a bank lending channel for Argentina. We do not
find evidence that changes in the interbank interest rate affect the growth rate of
total loans directly in Argentina. However, it does indirectly through interactions:
the interbank interest rate affects the loan supply through its interactions with
capitalization and liquidity. As for Colombia, there is direct bank lending channel,
which is reinforced through interactions with capitalization and liquidity. Also,
using a panel data of more than 3300 Colombian firms, we provide additional
support to the existence of a bank lending channel for Colombia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
model developed by Kishan and Opiela (2000), which has testable implications
for the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the data and summary statistics
and evidence of a bank lending channel for other countries that has been
established in other’s work. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and results,
and Section 5 concludes.
2. A MOTIVATING MODEL
Kishan and Opiela (2000) provide evidence of the existence of a bank
lending channel of monetary policy in the US from 1980 to 1995. Following
3 Because demand deposits are insured, they are less subject to informational asymmetries relative
to other sources of funding (i.e. large time deposits). Meanwhile, other sources of funding for banks
are uninsured, which makes them more likely to suffer information problems. Therefore, bank
characteristics that are not so important for the obtention of deposits become very relevant for the
acquisition of other sources of funds, such as large CDs.
4 Another way in which a contractionary monetary policy can affect bank lending is through its
impact on the capitalization ratio. Banks face interest rate risk given their role in maturity
transformation: they hold long term assets (many of them with a fixed interest rate), which they
finance issuing short term liabilities. Therefore, a contractionary monetary policy, which increses
short-term interest rates, increases the debt of the banks and decreases the net present value of its
assets, thus reducing bank profits. If banks cannot reduce dividend payments substantially, then
equity is reduced. Given the minimum capitalization requirements, some banks that initially had a
low capitalization ratio, will have to cut lending to meet the capitalization requirement as a short
term response.
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Kashyap and Stein (1995), they try to identify the bank lending channel by
studying cross sectional differences on the response of bank lending to monetary
policy. To do so, they develop a model of a representative bank that has three
assets, namely required reserves (RR), loans (LN) and securities (SEC); and three
liabilities, namely, demand deposits (DD), large time deposits (TD) and capital
(K). For simplicity, the bank does not hold excess reserves, so RR = αDD, where
α ∈ [0,1] is determined by the central bank.
DD are assumed to be inversely related to the Fed funds rate:
DD a a rff =− 01 . A bank is assumed to have market power in the TD market as
well as in the LN market. Thus, it can raise TD by increasing its rate (rTD) over
the mean rate in the market (rTD  ), and can change loans by moving its loan rate
(rLN) with respect to the mean rate in the loan market (rLN ):
TD b b r r









Capital markets are assumed to be imperfect. This is introduced by
assuming that the interest rate sensitivities of TD and LN respectively
(b1, d1) > 0, depend on bank size and capitalization. Specifically, it is assumed
that b1 depends positively on both bank size and capitalization, following the
idea that larger and better capitalized banks will find it easier to raise funds by
issuing time deposits. Meanwhile, d1 depends positively on bank size only, reflecting
the idea that larger banks tend to give credit to larger firms which have better
access to alternative sources of funding. Thus, larger banks have a demand for











Securities are held as a buffer stock against liquidity shocks, and the mean
market rates of TD, SEC and LN are assumed to be directly related to the Fed
funds rate with fixed spreads:
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Banks are assumed to choose LN, TD and SEC to maximize profits,
(9) Profit r LN r SEC r DD r TD LN SEC DD TD =− + − − () Φ
subject to the balance sheet constraint (L N+S E C+R R=D D+T D+K )  and
the equations given above. ΦLN represents loan losses.
The first order conditions of this maximization problem yield the optimal
portfolio for the bank (i.e., LN , SEC , TD ). Taking derivatives of LN , SEC and
TD with respect to the Fed funds rate generates some testable implications. In
particular, assuming c1 < 1, the model predicts that an increase in this rate should
increase TD , decrease LN , and have an ambiguous effect on SEC (the sign of the












































More interesting testable implications, however, derive from the
introduction of the dependence of interest rate sensitivities of LC and TD on





































































First, the net effect of asset size on the sensitivity of LN to rff is
undetermined and depends on parameter values. This reflects the idea that two
factors play an important role for big banks: maybe they may face less asymmetries
of information than smaller banks, and therefore they can obtain easier alternative
sources of funds (TD) when a contractionary monetary policy reduces DD; but,
their clients are also bigger firms which tend to be more sensitive to interest
rates, so if big banks increase rLN due to higher costs of funding, they will loose
more demand for loans than smaller banks. Similarly, it is unclear the effect of
bank size on the sensitivity of TD to the Fed funds rate.
Furthermore, the sensitivity of LN to rff is lower for better capitalized
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less well capitalized banks do. Similarly, better capitalized banks will increase
more TD in times of monetary policy tightening.
Thus, capitalization and bank size appear to matter for lending. In Section




The data for banks of Argentina are taken from the Información de
Entidades Financieras releases of the Central Bank of Argentina, which consists
of the monthly balance sheets that each bank is required to report to the
Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias (the financial
institutions’ regulator). The period used is 2003:08 to 2005:11, that is after the
2001-2002 crisis. Unfortunately, such releases only include those banks that
existed as of November 2005; therefore, banks that disappeared throughout the
period are not included in the dataset.
The data for banks of Colombia comes from financial statements that
banks report monthly to the Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, which
regulates the financial system. The sample used covers the period 1995:1 to
2005:9, and consists of all the commercial banks that were operating at every
moment of time. The panel of banks is unbalanced, with a maximum number of
40 banks in 1997:12, and a minimum of 21 banks at the final period. The number
of banks at the beginning of the sample period was 38. The reduction in the
number of banks during the last ten years reflects the consequences of the period
of stress experienced by financial institutions in Colombia between 1997 and
1999, which led to bank failures, acquisitions and merges among financial
institutions6.
The macroeconomic variables used were taken from several sources:
International Financial Statistics data was used for CPI and bilateral exchange
rate peso-US dollar for both countries. As a proxy of GDP, which is not available
on a monthly basis, the Estimador Mensual de Actividad Económica Index
(EMAE) without seasonality was used for Argentina, and the Indice de Producción
Real Manufacturera (IPM) for Colombia. The first one is available online in a
monthly frequency from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos of Argentina
(INDEC), while the second one is available online at the Central Bank of
Colombia’s (BANREP) web page.
6 The way in which the Superintendencia Financiera handles acquisitions and merges is the following:
when a big bank acquires a small bank (definition), the small bank disappears while the big bank’s
figures become those of the group; when a merge takes place, both banks disappear at the time of
the merge, and a new one starts operating the period after.
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The interbank interest rate is used as the monetary policy instrument.
This variable was chosen, because it is the most commonly used in monetary
transmission mechanism and inflation targeting studies (see, for example, Gómez
and Julio, 2001). The interbank interest rate of Argentina is available online at
the webpage of the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA), and that of Colombia is
available online at the webpage of BANREP.
3.2 Construction of variables
As a proxy of bank-specific characteristics, capitalization ratio and liquidity
were used. All these variables were constructed from balance sheet data. The
ratio of equity over assets was used as our measure of capitalization. Liquidity
was measured as the ratio between liquid assets minus short-term liabilities and
deposits (checking, savings and time deposits).
These variables are included to test whether bank specific variables affect
lending, and whether banks with different characteristics respond differently to
monetary policy shocks. According to the bank lending channel, capital market
imperfections affect the relationship between banks and their investors. Therefore,
it is expected that variables that proxy for the financial health of a bank, such as
capitalization and liquidity, matter in these relationships.
3.3 Characteristics of the banking sectors in Argentina and Colombia
Tables 1 to 3 show summary statistics of characteristics of the banking
systems in Argentina and Colombia at different points in time. These
characteristics are presented in two ways: the first four columns in each table
group banks according to asset size, while the last four group them according to
the capitalization ratio. For instance, the fourth column “>75", stands for the
group composed by the 25 percent of the largest banks in terms of assets. Similarly,
the eighth column, also labeled “>75”, stands for the group composed by the 25
percent banks with largest capitalization ratio.
According to Table 1, the best capitalized banks have significantly lower
liquidity ratios. This can be explained by the fact that holding liquid assets has
an opportunity cost which well capitalized banks need not incur.
It is also important to note that there are differences in the ratios of
capitalization among groups of banks in Argentina. For instance, for November
2005, while the 25 percent least capitalized banks had a capital ratio of 5.6%, the
top 25 percent had a capital ratio of almost 55%7. These differences are much
7 There is a caveat regarding the way capitalization is measured. Since it is calculated as equity over
assets, and after the crisis of 2001-2002 the Central Bank of Argentina allowed the banks to choose
the way in which they would account for the losses, some banks may have lower capitalization
ratios even though they decided to account for all the losses early in 2002 or 2003, while others still
have not accounted for all the losses due to the crises and default. This problem does not have a
solution since the Central Bank of Argentina does not make this information public.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA
(NOVEMBER 2005)
By Asset Size (percentile) By Capitalization (percentile)
Characteristics <  25 25-50 50-75 > 75 <  25 25-50 50-75 > 75
Market Share (percent)
Total Assets 0.65 3.44 9.60 86.31 28.15 54.33 15.74 1.78
Total Loans 0.74 3.14 8.44 87.68 24.34 58.91 14.60 2.15
Securities 0.51 2.80 10.15 86.53 33.69 51.71 12.98 1.62
Deposits 0.21 3.16 9.20 87.44 24.08 64.03 11.36 0.52
Ratios as group aggregate (percent)
Loans to Asset 41.16 33.15 31.88 36.86 31.36 39.34 33.66 43.89
Securities to Assets 23.29 24.06 31.18 29.58 35.30 28.08 24.33 26.91
Deposits to Liabilities 38.38 70.44 72.37 69.34 55.52 80.61 57.33 42.89
Capitalization 49.25 16.17 14.36 10.79 5.59 11.26 18.45 54.88
Liquidity 11.80 17.70 26.60 28.47 32.99 24.72 30.57 11.53
In millions of pesos of November 2005 In millions of US dollars of November 2005
Total Assets of the system 208159 Total Assets of the system 70658
Total Loans of the system 75522 Total Loans of the system 25636
Total Securities of the system 61406 Total Securities of the system 20844
Total Deposits of the system 133317 Total Deposits of the system 45254
Number  of Banks 72
Source: Author’s elaboration based on “Información de Entidades Financieras”, Banco Central,
Argentina.
stronger than those of banks in the US and other countries such as Colombia. It
can also be observed that the group of more capitalized banks has a significantly
lower ratio of deposits to liabilities. This can be explained by the fact that more
capitalized banks have better access to alternative sources of funding, and therefore
they depend less on deposits to finance their positions in assets.
As for Colombia, some important facts can be observed from Table 2.
When looking at the differences according to size, it can be noticed that smaller
banks tend to have a bigger participation of loans in their assets, vis-a-vis larger
banks. Similarly, they have a smaller participation of securities. That trend explains
the fact that smaller banks appear to have lower liquidity ratios than larger banks
do. Similarly, the biggest banks have a high capitalization ratio, relative to the
mean of the system. Equally as important, the banks in the smallest percentile
are the less capitalized among commercial banks. Note also that banks of any
size obtain their financing basically from deposits8.
8 Deposits include demand deposits as well as time deposits.
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Meanwhile, when looking at the characteristics of banks according to
their capitalization ratio, trends seem to be less clear. The most capitalized banks
(those above the 75th percentile) are also the biggest ones, according to market
shares. But, for lower percentiles, there is no clear relationship between size, as
proxied by market shares, and the degree of capitalization. More importantly,
when dividing banks according to the capitalization ratio, there does not appear
to be a pattern in asset composition; the percentage of loans to total assets are
very similar among groups, as well as the percentage of securities. But, what can
be observed is that the most capitalized banks have a larger proportion of
commercial loans and a smaller participation of consumption loans.
Nevertheless, banks’ characteristics in Colombia appear to have changed
over time. Table 3 replicates the information shown in Table 3 for December
TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM IN COLOMBIA
(SEPTEMBER 2005)
By Size (percentile) By Capitalization (percentile)
Characteristic <  25 25-50 50-75 > 75 <  25 25-50 50-75 > 75
Market Share (percent)
Total Assets 7.9 15.4 25.8 50.9 23.1 19.8 10.7 46.4
Total Loans 9.5 17.6 24.3 48.7 22.4 19.9 12.3 45.4
Securities 5.9 11.7 29.5 52.9 24.2 19.9 8.0 47.9
Deposits 7.5 15.9 26.7 49.9 23.1 20.4 11.0 45.5
Ratios (percent)
Loans to Assets 62.6 59.2 49.0 49.8 50.4 52.3 59.9 50.9
Securities to Assets 25.3 25.6 38.7 35.2 35.5 34.0 25.3 34.9
Deposits to Liabilities 75.8 85.9 84.6 81.4 79.0 84.2 84.5 83.1
Liquidity 15.9 24.8 41.4 37.8 36.2 36.1 24.1 36.8
Capitalization 8.8 12.7 10.8 12.1 7.9 10.7 11.9 13.8
Participation of Total Loans (percent)
Commercial 52.4 51.1 60.5 70.7 56.5 57.8 52.4 71.5
Consumer 46.8 25.6 30.6 17.5 27.6 33.8 26.6 19.1
Mortgage 0.4 24.3 8.7 10.0 9.6 9.4 22.1 10.0
In millions of Colombian pesos of November 2005 In millions of US dollars of November 2005
Total Assets of the system 110,231,651 Total Assets of the system 47,690
Total Loans of the system 57,357,481 Total Loans of the system 24,815
Total Securities of the system 37,273,492 Total Securities of the system 16,126
Total Deposits of the system 80,323,813 Total Deposits of the system 34,721
Total Number of Commercial Banks 21
Source: Author’s elaboration based on monthly report of Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
05-J. Gomez 4/5/07, 16:02 117118 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 44 (Mayo) 2007
TABLE 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM IN COLOMBIA
(DECEMBER 1996)
By Size (percentile) By Capitalization (percentile)
Characteristic <  25 25-50 50-75 > 75 <  25 25-50 50-75 > 75
Market Share (percent)
Total Assets 4.6 11.8 28.8 54.8 31.8 15.5 25.2 27.4
Total Loans 4.7 11.2 29.6 54.5 36.8 16.5 22.7 24.0
Securities 4.2 12.1 25.7 58.0 15.3 11.1 29.6 44.0
Deposits 4.0 11.6 31.1 53.3 38.7 16.8 22.8 21.8
Ratios (percent)
Loans to Assets 66.4 62.2 67.4 65.2 75.7 69.8 59.1 57.2
Securities to Assets 10.4 11.9 10.3 12.1 5.5 8.3 13.5 18.5
Deposits to Liabilities 69.4 78.9 81.9 82.8 93.1 86.3 73.6 70.5
Liquidity 8.8 9.4 9.7 10.7 4.0 7.1 11.7 19.5
Capitalization 14.8 13.6 12.2 13.6 5.9 10.5 15.0 21.9
Participation of Total Loans (percent)
Commercial 82.5 70.5 40.9 49.7 26.5 44.8 71.6 73.0
Consumer 17.5 28.9 19.7 14.6 5.7 22.4 28.1 23.7
Mortgage 0.0 0.6 39.4 35.7 67.8 32.8 0.3 3.3
In millions of Colombian pesos of November 2005 In millions of US dollars of November 2005
Total Assets of the system 94,962,893 Total Assets of the system 53,207
Total Loans of the system 62,216,689 Total Loans of the system 34,859
Total Securities of the system 10,956,440 Total Securities of the system 6,139
Total Deposits of the system 65,782,971 Total Deposits of the system 36,858
Total Number of Commercial Banks 40
Source: Author’s elaboration based on monthly report of Superintendencia Financiera de
Colombia.
1996. By the end of 1996, there was a negative relation between capitalization
and the ratio of loans to assets; while banks in the first quartile according to
capitalization had a ratio of loans to assets above 75%, the quartile of the most
capitalized banks had a ratio below 60%. Correspondingly, the ratio of securities
to assets had a positive relationship with the degree of capitalization. When
comparing asset composition between 1996 and 2005, it is noticeable that, in
general, banks turned to have more securities and fewer loans in their portfolios
after the crisis. Note that the ratio of loans to assets reduced importantly for all
groups of banks, while the ratio of securities to assets rose significantly. This can
probably be explained by the systematic default of banks that took higher risks
in the period of credit boom before the crisis, and by more conservative lending
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policies taken by surviving banks that tend to account better for risks coming
from the lending business.
Another important feature, now regarding liability composition, is that
more capitalized banks in 1997 tended to have a lower ratio of deposits to total
liabilities than less capitalized banks. This seems to provide some indirect evidence
of the presence of capital market imperfections for banks, as predicted by the
bank lending channel theory, and also of the importance of the capitalization
ratio as an indicator of the degree of informational asymmetries faced by banks.
Basically, the fact that there is a negative relation between the degree of
capitalization and the ratio of deposits to liabilities supports the idea that better
capitalized banks are less deposit-dependent, in the sense that they can find easier
substitutes for these than less capitalized banks do. Nevertheless, this relationship
tended to disappear in time, becoming less clear in recent years. This could have
happened because the differences in capitalization between different groups of
banks has reduced, due to failure of poorly capitalized banks and also to financial
decisions taken by surviving banks.
As a final point concerning the evolution of the banking sector
characteristics in time for Colombia, it is important to mention that more
capitalized banks appear to have a larger proportion of commercial loans in their
portfolios. This could suggest that banks that lend to large firms are healthier
and better capitalized banks.
One can observe several differences for Argentina and Colombia from
Tables 1 to 3. One is that the banking system of Argentina is much more
concentrated than that of Colombia. For example, while the largest banks in
Argentina hold 86% of the assets of the system, that figure is 51% for Colombia,
even though the number of commercial banks in Argentina is more than three
times that of Colombia. Next, the capitalization ratios for Argentina are much
higher than those for Colombia, especially in recent years. Also, banks in
Argentina with the highest capitalization ratios are small banks in terms of asset
size, whereas in Colombia, those with the highest capitalization ratios are big
banks in terms of asset size.
3.4 Evidence of a Bank Lending Channel in other Countries
Kashyap and Stein (1995) use quarterly data on banks operating in the
United States from 1976.1 to 1992.2. They classify banks by their asset size and
use the Fed Funds rate as the monetary policy instrument. They find that a
tightening in monetary policy declines deposits for all size categories and in a
similar fashion. They find evidence of a bank lending channel for all but the
biggest asset size category –that is, increases in the Fed funds rate has a negative
and statistically significant effect on the growth rate of total loans. If instead of
total loans, C&I loans are used, they find similar results. They also find that
small bank securities holdings are more sensitive to changes in monetary policy,
although they recognize that the results they get are not as clear as with growth
rate of loans.
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Kishan and Opiela (2000) also provide evidence that support the existence
of a bank lending channel in the United States. They use quarterly data from
1980.1 to 1995.4 for 13042 commercial banks and divide banks according to
their size and capital adequacy. They find that loans of small undercapitalized
banks are more responsive to monetary policy. They also find that large time
deposits of small undercapitalized banks are unresponsive to monetary policy.
They conclude that the asset size and the capital ratio have important implications
for the strength and distributional effects of monetary policy and for the relation
between stabilization and regulatory policy.
Altunbas et al. (2002) use yearly balance sheet data to estimate the response
of monetary policy stance between 1991 and 1999 for countries in the European
Monetary Union (EMU). They classify banks according to asset size and capital
and find that undercapitalized banks of any size tend to respond more to changes
in monetary policy when they use the pooled data on the eleven EMU countries.
When they look at individual country estimates for France and Germany they do
not find evidence supporting a bank lending channel, but they do find evidence
for Italy and Spain. In Spain,they find some evidence that a bank lending channel
exists for the largest undercapitalized and adequately capitalized banks. In Italy,
they find some evidence of a bank lending channel for adequately capitalized
and overcapitalized banks. They conclude that more research is needed to further
investigate bank lending channels in the smaller EMU countries and that balance
sheet data availability should be improved and different model specifications
should be used –i.e. , more indicators of monetary policy stance and different lag
structures.
Alfaro et al. (2005) use quarterly data from 1990.1 to 2002.2 and find
evidence supporting a bank lending channel in Chile with a significant impact
on macroeconomic activity. The evidence of a bank lending channel is more
important for banks with low liquidity ratios and to lesser extent smaller and less
capitalized banks.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical specification in this panel approach is the following:















32 1 XZ βφ 1   α m mmycrisis u ti t +
where yit represents the growth rate of total loans for bank i at time t; X is a
matrix of macroeconomic variables including a proxy for the growth rate of
GDP, growth rate of real exchange rate and the policy instrument, which is the
real interbank interest rate (denoted by x3it and calculated as the nominal
interbank interest rate minus observed monthly inflation rate). Z is a matrix of
bank specific variables, namely, capitalization and liquidity. Monthly dummies
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to control for seasonality in the data were also included; Dummycrisis is a
dummy variable included for Colombia to control for the financial crisis period
between July 1998 and December 2000. 12
′  is a 21 ×  row vector of ones and
“”    is the Hadamard product. The error term was assumed i.i.d. as well as to
account for bank specific AR(1) structure. For Colombia, another two
regressions are considered, namely, one for commercial loans and one for
consumer loans.































































where 1, ...,m are the banks and and the X* matrix contains all the variables in
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As a robustness test, the variance structure of the errors was also specified
to account for autocorrelation of order 1 specific to each panel9.
The results for Argentina suggest that there is no direct bank lending
channel triggered by changes in the interbank interest rate. But there is indirect
effect on bank lending through the interactions of the interbank interest rate and
capitalization and, to a less extent, liquidity.
These results suggest that when the interbank interest rate changes, the
growth rate of loans will be affected less the better capitalized (and the higher its
liquidity ratio) the bank is.
9 Some studies have used dynamic panel data models to look for evidence of a bank lending channel.
However, since the endogenous variable is the growth rate of loans, it is not clear why the growth
rate of loans of today depending on its previous realizations. The current period growth rate of
loans might depend on past periods realizations through demand side influences, but these should
be captured by the macroeconomic and bank specific variables.
(16)
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TABLE 4
TOTAL EFFECT COEFFICIENTS FOR ARGENTINA
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL LOANS
Variable Coefficient Std.Err
Interbank rate –0.032 0.022
Interactions:
Interbank rate x Liquidity 0.048** 0.015
Interbank rate x Capitalization 0.143* 0.025
*, ** Significant at the 1 and 10 percent level.
The results for Colombia agree with the basic ideas of the bank lending
channel. See Tables 5 and 6, which show the results of the regressions
corresponding to total loans and commercial loans. Note that the impact of
monetary policy on the growth rate of loans is negative; increments in the interbank
interest rate lead to reductions in the growth rate of loans. However, the impact is
not the same across banks; those institutions that have lower capitalization and
liquidity ratios are affected more.
This suggests that these bank specific variables, capitalization and liquidity,
affect lending decisions done by banks, and also the ability that they have to
obtain alternative sources of funding when a monetary policy shock affects the
amount of core deposits in the economy. The interpretation of the coefficient on
the interaction terms is the following: when the interbank rate goes up by one
percentage point (i.e. from 6 to 7 percent), there is a direct effect on total loans,
that according to Table 5 will fall by 0.68 percent. But the more capitalized a
bank is, the smaller the fall in deposits will be. For example, total loans a bank
with a capitalization of 0.10 will fall by 0.6824 – 4.542 * 0.10 = 0.228, while a
bank with capitalization ratio of 0.15, the fall will be of smaller magnitude, in
fact negligible: 0.6824 – 4.542 * 0.15 = 0.
The results are quite different when the growth rate of consumption loans
in used in the regressions. The interest rate is not significant in explaining changes
in the growth rate of these loans, and bank specific variables do not appear to
matter either. This result suggests that consumer loans have a different dynamics
than commercial loans. However, as it was before seen, commercial loans
represent the great majority of total loans, and that can explain that even when
there is no evidence of a bank lending channel for consumer loans, there is
evidence for total loans.
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TABLE 5
TOTAL EFFECT COEFFICIENTS FOR COLOMBIA
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL LOANS
Variable Coefficient Std.Err
Interbank rate –.6824* 0.0551
Interactions:
Interbank rate x Liquidity 1.6949* 0.1379
Interbank rate x Capitalization 4.5424* 0.3608
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 6
TOTAL EFFECT COEFFICIENTS FOR COLOMBIA
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF C OMMERCIAL LOANS
Variable Coefficient Std.Err
Interbank rate –0.6710* 0.0757
Interactions:
Interbank rate x Liquidity 1.5629* 0.1892
Interbank rate x Capitalization 4.7544* 0.4947
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
5. BANK LENDING CHANNEL FOR COLOMBIA USING FIRMS’ DATA
As a robustness test for the evidence of bank lending channel for Colombia,
we analyze balance sheet data for Colombian firms. In order to identify the bank
lending channel with these data, we separate firms into two groups according to
the degree of leverage10. Group 1 is composed by firms in the lowest quartile of
leverage and Group 2 is composed by firms in the highest quartile. The intuition
behind this way of grouping firms is that in moments of tight monetary policy,
firms with higher indebtedness will find it harder to obtain liquidity. Therefore,
the impact of a change in interest rates on these firms should be stronger than on
those with lower leverage ratios.
Kashyap et al. (1993) developed a simple theoretical framework to model
changes in optimal debt structure of the firm over time. In times of contractionary
monetary policy, bank loans experience a supply shock due to the fall in deposits.
10 Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of the firm, following the
conventional definition.
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As the spread between the interest rates on bank loans and non-bank debt rises,
the lending channel would anticipate a decrease in bank lending in the firm’s
optimal debt structure. Furthermore, as risk increases in periods of contractionary
monetary policy, banks will be more reluctant to lend to firms with poor
information availability.
5.1 Data Source
The data for firms was collected by the Superintendencia de Sociedades,
the organism that regulates non-financial firms in Colombia. The sample consists
of a panel of annual observations on firms from 1995 to 2004. For each year,
more than six thousand firms submit information about their balance sheets. The
panel is unbalanced, due to the entry and exit of firms, and also to the fact that
some firms report their balances for some years but not for others (not necessarily
for consecutive years).
After eliminating the data base for firms that have an early exit or a late
entry, or that do not report for the whole span of time, we are left with a balanced
panel of around four thousand non-financial firms belonging to various economic
sectors.
5.2 Empirical Specification and Results
The empirical specification in this panel approach is the following:
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where BDit represents the ratio of bank debt to total debt for firm i at time t; Rt is
the real interbank interest rate, which instruments for monetary policy; inv controls
for inventories (the decision of increasing or decreasing inventories might affect
the debt structure in the margin) and cap for capitalization. The parameters of
interest are γ, θ, η and μ; in particular, the vector θ, which multiplies the instrument
for monetary policy. Dummycrisis is a dummy variable included for Colombia to
control for the financial crisis period of 1999 and 2000. The error term is assumed
i.i.d.
Because lag values of the dependent variable are included as regressors,
we use Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology, which corrects the inconsistency
of the within estimator and provides a consistent and efficient estimator. The
intuition of including lags of the ratio of bank debt as covariates is that the ratio
presents some inertia over time, in the sense that the debt structure of firms does
not change significantly in short periods of time.
The main results are summarized in Table 7, which presents the long run
coefficients of the real interest rate for both groups of firms.
As shown in Table 7, the ratio of bank debt to total debt of both groups of
firms goes down when the real interest rate increases. This is due to both supply
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and demand factors and debt substitution. However, the impact is clearly bigger
and more significant for high leveraged firms than for low leveraged firms. This
provides some additional support for the existence of a bank lending channel of
monetary policy in Colombia.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we find empirical evidence of bank lending channel for
Colombia. As for Argentina, we do not find evidence that changes in the interbank
interest rate affect the growth rate of total loans directly. It does, however,
indirectly through interactions: the interbank interest rate affects the loan supply
through its interactions with capitalization and liquidity. As for Colombia, there
is direct bank lending channel, which is reinforced through interactions with
capitalization and liquidity.
Bank specific variables are key in analyzing how changes in the interbank
rate affect the growth rate of loans for Argentina and Colombia. It is particularly
important the way in which capitalization affects the lending ability of banks;
better capitalized banks should be able to lend more in moments of constrained
liquidity. This might be the result of a combination of minimum capital regulations
and informational frictions in markets for banks’ funds, which affect both the
decisions taken by banks and their ability to raise funds in markets alternative to
the deposits one.
Finally, using a panel data of more than 3300 firms, we provide additional
support to the existence of a bank lending channel for Colombia.
TABLE 7
EVIDENCE OF BANK LENDING CHANNEL FOR FINNS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RATIO OF BANK DEBT TO TOTAL DEBT
Group 1: Low-Leveraged Firms
Variable Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate –0.0068* 0.0037
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Group 2: High-Leveraged Finns
Variable Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate –0.0191* 0.0068
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
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